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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Christopher Ray Schultz appeals from the Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty. He asserts the district court
erred denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea as, by the preponderance of the
evidence, a manifest injustice existed because the State breached a plea agreement
made with him in juvenile court.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs
A.

The Agreement Reached Durina The Juvenile Court Proceedinas

Mr. Schultz was a minor when the State accused him of committing a number of
offenses involved in this litigation. (#33000, Tr. 1010512005, p.5, Ls.20-23.) The State
initially prosecuted Mr. Schultz' case in juvenile court and Doug Whipple, the Public
Defender for Cassia and Minidoka County, represented him. (Tr., p.29, L.17 - p.30,
L.15, p.35, Ls.21-25, p.38, Ls.17-20; R., p.89.) In September 2005, Mr. Whipple's job
was to oversee all the deputy public defenders and their activities, and specifically
handle the juvenile cases. (Tr., p.38, L.24 - p. 39, L.3.) Mr. Whipple would handle the
juvenile case and upon waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, the deputy public defender
assigned to the felony court would handle the case.' (Tr., p.40, Ls.7-19.) After waiver
of juvenile jurisdiction, Mr. Haley would represent Mr. Schultz.

(R., p.89.)

On

October I,2005, Dennis Byington became the Cassia County Public Defender;

This general process in Cassia County is the same today. (Tr., p.40, Ls.12-13.)

however, Mr. Whipple remained Mr. Schultz' juvenile attorney and a part-time deputy
public defender for the Cassia County Public Defender's office. (Tr., p.35, L.24 - p. 36,

Deputy Prosecutor Timothy Schneider represented the State during Mr. Schultz'
juvenile proceedings. (Tr., p.59, Ls.19 - p.60, L.3, p.33, Ls.14-25; R., p.89.) As a
deputy prosecuting attorney for Cassia County, Mr. Schneider had the authority to enter
into agreements with juveniles and other criminal defendants. (Tr., p.60, Ls.4-9, p.98,
Ls.17-19.)
On October 5, 2005, Mr. Schultz appeared in juvenile court with his court
appointed attorney Doug Whipple and Mr. Schneider appeared on behalf of the State.
(See generally Tr. 10/05/2005.) At the hearing, Mr. Whipple stated:
Your Honor, in talking with Christopher and previously talking with
Mr. Schneider, Mr. Schneider agreed that upon waiver and if Christopher
ultimately ends up entering a guilty plea to at least some of the charges,
the State would make a recommendation to the district court judge of a
sentence not to exceed - and certainly it could be less than this
depending on negotiations, but not to exceed a 5 year minimum and a 20
year top on the sentence.
(#33000, Tr. 10/05/2005, p.3, L.23 - p.4, L.5.) Thereafter, Mr. Whipple informed the
juvenile court that after reviewing reports with his client, Mr. Schultz was prepared to
waive his rights as a juvenile and to proceed into adult court. (#33000, Tr. 10/05/2005,
p.3, Ls.7-11.) The parties recognized that waiver was highly probable. (#33000 Tr.

The district court then asked: "Christopher, I have heard what Mr. Whipple has
represented to the Court that in accordance - is that your agreement on this matter?"
(#33000 Tr. 10/05/2005, p.3, Ls.22-24.) Mr. Schultz, responded, "Yes, your Honor."

(#33000 Tr. 10/05/2005, p.4, Ls.21-24.) Mr. Schneider made no objection to the stated
terms of the agreement. (Tr., p.53, Ls.18-22, p.57, L.2 - p. 57, L.9.)
Seventeen-year-old Mr. Schultz agreed to be waived into adult court upon
agreement with the State to limit its sentencing recommendation if he ultimately pled
guilty to some of the charges. (Tr. 10/05/2005, p.3, L.23 - p.4, L.5.) The State agreed
to recommend no more than a unified twenty-year sentence, with no more than five
years fixed. (Tr. 10/05/2005, p.4, Ls.3-5.) The district court recognized the parties'
stipulation and waived Mr. Schultz into adult court. (Tr. 10/05/2005, p.5, L.4 - p.6,
L.ll.)
The district court proceeded to finalize the waiver of Mr. Schultz into adult court.
(#33000 Tr. 10/05/2005, p.4, L.4 - p.5, L.14.) The district court asked Mr. Schneider to
prepare the proper order and told the parties that the waiver would take effect upon the
presentation of the order and the complaint to the court. (#33000 Tr. 10/05/2005, p.5,
Ls.13-18.) Mr. Schneider agreed. (#33000 Tr. 10/05/2005, p.5, L.19.)
Other than the information contained in the transcript, Attorneys Whipple and
Schneider had no recollection of Mr. Schultz' case. (See generally Tr.) Mr. Whipple's
standard practice would have been to negotiate with Mr. Schneider a day or two before
the juvenile's hearing. (Tr., p.33, Ls.14-25.) In placing an agreement on the record,
Mr. Whipple's general practice was to state the specific terms of the plea agreement.
(Tr., p.47, Ls.1-8.) Sometimes, only the summary of the plea agreement was placed on
the record and not necessarily all of the specific terms. (Tr., p.47, Ls.16-22.) In all
cases, Mr. Whipple attempted to place the major aspects of the agreement on the
record. (Tr., p.48, Ls.2-4.)

In this case, Mr. Whipple thought that the stated terms could have been the full
and complete recitation of the State's offer; however, Mr. Whipple has no independent
recollection of the plea agreement. (Tr., p.50, Ls.16-20.) During cross-examination, the
State asked Mr. Whipple whether there would have been no reason to object because
the stated terms on the record were an accurate reflection of the agreement. (Tr., p.57,
Ls.10-24.)

A key factor and an important component in the plea agreement was

Mr. Schultz' agreement to be waived into adult court. (Tr., p.37, Ls.18-21, p.52, Ls.2-5.)
Although Mr. Schneider admitted that he had authority to enter into plea
agreements with individual criminal defendants, he explained that in waiver cases it
would be standard for felony prosecutor Blaine Cannon to fashion the plea agreement.
(Tr., p.99, Ls.2-8, see also Tr., p.68, Ls.13-21.)

Mr. Schneider, however, had no

recollection of discussing this case with Blaine Cannon.

(Tr., p.100, Ls.7-13.)

Mr. Schneider could not remember who actually negotiated Mr. Schultz' case. (Tr.,
p.99, Ls.13-17.) Regardless, Mr. Schneider would have had authority, even if Blaine
Cannon had been involved in the case, to make an offer and to enter into a plea
agreement with Mr. Schultz. (Tr., p.100, Ls.19-24.) Mr. Schneider admitted that he and
Mr. Whipple would have at least discussed what was happening with the case on the
day of the hearing; however, yet again, he had no independent recollection of any of the
discussions. (Tr., p.lOO, Ls.2-6.) Mr. Schneider stated that if the agreement placed on
the record was incorrect, he would have corrected it.

(Tr., p.102, Ls.10-20.)

Mr. Schneider informed the court that the stated terms on the record appeared to be a
standard recitation and he did not know what would have been corrected on the
agreement. (Tr., p. 102, Ls.18-20.)

Mr. Schultz agreed to waive his rights as a juvenile and proceed into adult court.
(Tr. 10/05/2005, p.4, Ls.8-10.) When the district court asked Mr. Schultz if this was his
agreement on the matter, Mr. Schultz responded in the affirmative. (Tr. 10/05/2005,
p.4, Ls.21-24.) Pursuant to the stipulation, the district court made factual findings and
conclusions of law completing the process of waiving Mr. Schultz into adult court. (Tr.
'f0/05/2005, p.5, L.4 - p.6, L.??.)
6.

Mr. Schultz' Further Neqotiations

Mr. Cannon acknowledged an expectation exists that the parties will follow the
plea agreement and that placing the agreement on the record helps the parties follow
the agreement.

(Tr., p.90, Ls.9-14.)

Mr. Cannon noted that the juvenile waiver

transcript appeared to require two conditions of Mr. Schultz if the contested paragraph
amounted to a plea agreement. (Tr., p.90, L.15 - p.91, L.5.) The first, waive juvenile
jurisdiction; and the second, plead guilty to "some of the charges[.]" (Tr., p.91, Ls.2-5.)
Mr. Cannon testified that Mr. Schultz' continued negotiations centered on the
specific crime(s) he would be willing to plead guilty to. (Tr., p.76, L.21 - p.77, L.lO.)
Mr. Cannon wanted Mr. Schultz to plead guilty to a sex offense whereas Mr. Schultz
wanted to accept responsibility for the other offenses. (Tr., p.77, Ls.1-10, p.80, Ls.413.) Mr. Schultz did not want to plead to the attempted rape; Mr. Cannon found that to
be unacceptable. (Tr., p.82, Ls.19-23.) Mr. Cannon admitted that part of the struggle
that he had with Mr. Schultz was determining what charge he would plead guilty to.
(Tr., p.91, Ls.19-23.) As the agreement did not specify what offenses Mr. Schultz would
plead guilty to, the fact that the parties' negotiations centered on which offense would
become a conviction is consistent with the terms of the agreement read on the record.

C.

The Breach

Mr. Schultz ultimately pled guilty to some of the charges; he entered ~lforc?
pleas to robbery and to attempted rape with the enhanced penalty. (Tr. 12/27/05, p.21,
L.8 - p.22, L.23.) At the sentencing hearing, the State argued for an indeterminate life
sentence, with a twenty year fixed term. (Tr., p.96, Ls.2-5; #33000 Tr. 03/10/06, p.59,
L.4 - p.60, L.18.) Mr. Cannon admitted that he did not recommend the sentence stated
at the waiver hearing. (Tr., p.95, L.21 - p.96, L.1.) Mr. Cannon did not recommend a
unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed. (Tr., p.95, L.21 - p.96, L.l, p.96,
Ls.14-15.)
D.

Knowledge Of The Existed Plea Aureement Between Mr. Schultz And The
State Entered On The Record In Juvenile Court

Prior to Mr. Schultz waiving his right to a jury trial in adult court, Mr. Cannon was
aware that Mr. Schultz believed he had a plea agreement with the State limiting its
sentencing recommendation. (Tr., p.81, Ls.4-12, p.89, L.l-7.) Mr. Cannon recalled that
Mr. Schultz believed he had a deal with the State because he waived into adult court.
(Tr., p.82, L.24 - p.83, L.3.) Mr. Cannon informed Mr. Haley that the offer had been
withdrawn because Mr. Schultz had a preliminary hearing, he now knew the case better,
and had been preparing for trial. (Tr., p.81, Ls.10-15, p.94, Ls.11-24.) Mr. Cannon felt
that Mr. Schultz had not really given anything up by waiving juvenile jurisdiction and,
therefore, he felt there was nothing preventing him "from renegotiating or withdrawing
the offer or completely starting over from scratch." (Tr., p.95, Ls.9-15.) Mr. Cannon
claimed that he told Mr. Haley to file a motion if he thought he had breached the plea

* North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
6

agreement. (Tr., p.81, Ls.17-22, p.83, Ls.4-8.) Moreover, Mr. Cannon felt that the
parties would be in the same position because they would "start this thing over" having
a waiver hearing. (Tr., p.81, Ls.14-22, see also p.83, Ls.8-15.) Mr. Cannon did not feel
that there was any remedy to the State's breach. (Tr., p.83, Ls.9-22.)
E.

No Additional Terms To The Aareement Read On The Record At The
Juvenile Hearing

Sometimes when transfer is inevitable, Mr. Cannon appears and watches the
waiver hearing, while Mr. Schneider actually handles the case at that hearing. (Tr.,
p.66, Ls.9-13.) Mr. Cannon admitted that Mr. Schneider "may have" been responsible
for "conveying an offer" to Mr. Whipple.

(Tr., p.70, Ls.5-8.) Mr. Cannon could not

remember any specific conversations he may have had with Mr. Schneider about
Mr. Schultz' case. (Tr., p.70, L.22 - p.71, L.3.) Although Mr. Cannon tried to inform the
court that he "may have" and he "think[sIn he probably did talk with Mr. Whipple about
the case, he could not remember any specifics. (Tr., p.71, Ls.11-17.) Mr. Cannon
could not recall any specific conversation with Mr. Whipple.

(Tr., p.72, Ls.10-12.)

Moreover, Mr. Whipple could not recall any conversations with Mr. Cannon about this
case.

(Tr., p.34, Ls.1-7.)

Nevertheless, Mr. Cannon admitted Mr. Schneider had

authority to make an agreement with Mr. Schultz. (Tr., p.93, Ls.12-13.)
Mr. Cannon acknowledged that nothing on the record indicated waiving the
preliminary hearing was part of the agreement. (Tr., p.92, Ls.16-19.) Mr. Cannon
further stated, "[wlhat Mr. Whipple stated on the record was not [his] agreement." (Tr.,
p.92, L.25

-

p.93, L.1.)

And although Mr. Cannon believed that Mr. Schultz' case

involved automatic waiver offenses and he allegedly had been negotiating the case with

the attorney who would be representing Mr. Schultz in the future, Mr. Cannon never
appeared at the juvenile waiver hearing although he was certain that he would
eventually be the prosecutor on the case in adult court. (Tr., p.66, Ls.3-4, p.69, Ls.2-20,
p.93, Ls.2-3.)
F.

Deputv Prosecutor Blaine Cannon's Written Offer Given To Mr. Schultz'
Future Lawyer

Mr. Cannon did not have a plea agreement with Mr. Schultz when he waived into
adult court. (Tr., p.76, Ls.7-16.) That is not to say that the State of Idaho, by and
through Mr. Schneider, did not have a binding agreement when he waived into adult
court. (#33000, Tr. 10/05/2005, p.3, L.23 - p.4, L.5.)
Deputy Prosecutor Blaine Cannon thought when the juvenile petition had been
filed with Cassia County on September 15, 2005, the case would most likely be handled
in adult court. (Tr., p.68, L.22 - p.69, L.4.) Prosecutor Cannon thought that Mr. Schultz'
case involved automatic waiver offenses.

(Tr., p.69, Ls.2-4.) Deputy Prosecuting

Attorney Blaine Cannon made a written offer dated September 20, 2005. (Tr., p.43,
Ls.2-16, p.63, Ls.4-7; Defendant's Exhibit B.) The written offer expired September 28,
2005. (Tr., p.43, Ls.20-21, p.63, Ls.8-10; Defendant's Exhibit B.) Mr. Whipple had no
recollection of ever seeing the written offer, although his name along with attorney
David Haley's name appeared on the offer. (Tr., p.43, 1.22 - p.44 L.8.) Mr. Cannon
had no evidence that Mr. Schultz accepted his offer that expired on September 28,
2005. (Tr., p.64, Ls.7-14.) Mr. Cannon also noted that someone changed his original
offer from a unified thirty-year, to a unified twenty-year sentence. (Tr., p.64, L.20 p.65, L.3.) Mr. Cannon believed it might have been his boss, Mr. Barrus, who modified

the written plea offer. (Tr., p.78, L.13 - p.79, L.13.) Mr. Cannon speculated that his
boss might have spoken to Mr. Whipple, but he had no idea. (Tr., p.79, Ls.9-13.)
Mr. Cannon claimed that although his initial offer was the thirty-year unified
sentence, he "think[sY they3 continued to talk although there was an expiration date
contained in the written offer. (Tr., p.65, Ls.3-5.) Mr. Cannon believed that at some
point after the offer, they started talking about the twenty-year sentence; however, he
was unsure about the timing of the change. (Tr., p.65, Ls.5-12.)
Mr. Cannon testified that although there was a written expiration date of the
written offer, he and Dave Haley, the attorney who would eventually represent
Mr. Schultz if the case was transferred to adult court, had an understanding that the
date on the offer was flexible so long as the defendant abided by the terms of the offer.
(Tr., p.73, Ls.2-7.) Again, not remembering whom he talked with, Mr. Cannon testified
about an alleged discussion of Mr. Schultz waiving juvenile jurisdiction in order to keep
the written offer open. (Tr., p.72, L.22 - p.73, L.3, p.77, Ls.11-15.) Mr. Cannon recalls
having several further discussions regarding the negotiations with Mr. Haley. (Tr., p.75,
Ls.17-25.)

In Mr. Cannon's opinion, any offers were withdrawn when Mr. Schultz

wanted to exercise his right to a jury trial. (Tr., p.77, Ls.15-22.)
G.

Mr. Schultz Argued Fundamental Error When The State Breached The
Plea Aareement On Direct Appeal

On March 15, 2006, the district court filed the Judgment of Conviction, Order of
Commitment. (R.33000, pp.77-80.) Mr. Schultz timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the
Judgment of Conviction. (R.33000, pp.83-85.) On appeal he argued that the State

breached its obligations under the plea agreement by recommending a sentence
greater than it had agreed to recommend depriving Mr. Schultz of his fundamental right
to due process. See Appellant's Brief in Docket No. #33000.
Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the Judgment of Conviction, it stated that
it "preserved Mr. Schultz' opportunity to pursue the matter through appropriate
proceedings in the trial court should he wish to do so."

State v. Schultz, 2008

Unpublished Opinion No. 464, Docket No. #33000, p.4 (May 13, 2008). The Court of
Appeals held that "the transcript of the trial court proceedings presents two clear and
unequivocal, but entirely contradictory, agreements pertaining to the sentence
recommendation that the State would make if Schultz pleaded guilty." State v. Schultz,
2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 464, Docket No. #33000, p.3 (May 13, 2008). However,
because there was nothing in the record that explained or reconciled the disparity
between the two agreements, the Court of Appeals held that there was insufficient
information in the record to rule on Mr. Schultz' claim that the prosecutor breached the
first plea agreement. State v. Schultz, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 464, Docket No.
#33000, p.4 (May 13, 2008). Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion imposing the sentences upon Mr. Schultz. State v.
Schultz, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 464, Docket No. #33000, p.4 (May 13, 2008).
The Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Schultz' timely filed petition for review.

Mr. Cannon could not recall who he was negotiating with, but all indicators point to
Mr. Haley. (See generally Tr.)

H.

The District Court Denied Mr. Schultz' Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea

Mr. Schultz filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp.23-24.) Mr. Schultz
incorporated his Appellant's Brief from docket no. 33000 as if fully argued to support of
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp.23-24.) Mr. Schultz asserted that the
State made an agreement with him in the juvenile court. (R., pp.23-24.) The district
court placed the burden on Mr. Schultz to prove that there was a mutual agreement on
the essential terms of the agreement. (R., p.93.) The district court determined that the
agreement placed on the record at the waiver hearing was only a counter offer. (R.,
p.94.) The district court concluded that Mr. Schultz failed to meet his burden to prove
the existence of the agreement. (R., p.94.) Thus, the State did not breach the plea
agreement when it made a different sentencing recommendation than the one stated at
the waiver hearing. (R., pp.94-95.) Therefore, the district court found Mr. Schultz failed
to demonstrate a manifest injustice would result from the denial of his motion to dismiss.
(R., p.95.) Mr. Schultz timely appealed.

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Schultz' motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Schultz' Motion To Withdraw his Guilty
Plea
A.

Introduction
Mr. Schultz asserts the district court erred denying his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea. He asserts that he demonstrated a manifest injustice because the State
breached the plea agreement stated on the record in juvenile court. The district court
erred when it failed to find the existence of a binding agreement for four reasons. First,
the plain language used at the hearing clearly indicated the parties had reached an
agreement. Second, the district court's findings were clearly erroneous based upon the
information obtained at the hearing. Third, fairness demands acknowledgment of the
agreement between the State and the defense.

Fourth, law of the case requires

recognizing the existence of the plea agreement. Having demonstrated an agreement
existed between the State and Mr. Schultz, the record reflects the State breached the
agreement. Therefore, Mr. Schultz should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea,
B.

Standard of Review When Considerinq A Motion To Withdraw A Guilty Plea
The standard of review for determining whether to allow the withdrawal of a guilty

plea after sentencing is well established. The defendant must show the district court
abused its discretion. State v. Gomez, 124 ldaho 177, 178, 857 P.2d 656, 657 (Ct. App.
1993). ldaho Criminal Rule 33(c) governs motions to withdraw guilty pleas. State v.

Carrasco, 117 ldaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 218, 284 (1990). The burden rests on the
defendant to demonstrate that the district court should have granted the defendant's

motion. Carrasco, 117 ldaho at 298, 787 P.2d at 284; Akin, 139 ldaho 160, 162, 75
P.3d 214, 216 (2003). The defendant must demonstrate a manifest injustice when the
motion to withdraw his plea is filed after the court imposes its sentence. I.C.R. 33(c).
Manifest injustice occurs when the State breaches the plea agreement.

State v.

Banuelos, 124 ldaho 569, 574, 861 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Ct. App. 1993). The defendant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the State breached the plea
agreement. Yarbrough v. Estelle, 677 F.Supp. 1033 (CA 1988).
C.

The District Court Erred Failing To Find The Existence Of A Settlement
Aareement Between The State And Mr. Schultz Wherein Mr. Schultz Agreed To
Be Waived Into Adult Court And. In Return, The State Agreed That If Mr. Schultz
Ultimatelv Pled Guiltv To Some Of The Charges It Would Limit Its Sentencing
Recommendations
There are four reasons to reverse the district court's findings and conclusions

that no agreement existed between the State and Mr. Schultz during the juvenile
proceedings. First, the literal words of the transcript demonstrate an agreement existed.
Second, the evidentiary hearing demonstrated an agreement existed and any findings
of fact or conclusions of law to the contrary are in error. Third, fundamental fairness
required the district court to acknowledge the existence of the agreement. Finally, the
fact that an agreement existed is the law of the case.
1.

A Settlement Aareement Existed That Resolved Juvenile Jurisdiction And
Bound The State To A Specific Limitation On The Sentencing
Recommendation, If The Case Settled Bv A Plea Instead Of A Trial

The United States Supreme Court has held that it is well established that plea
bargaining is an integral component of the criminal justice system and that both sides
should be held to their agreement. Sanfobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).

An overwhelming percentage of the criminal cases are resolved by plea agreements.
Maryland v. Brockman, 357 A.2d 376, 380(MD, 1976). Not only are there benefits to
the defendant and the State directly, but settling cases without the necessity of a trial
benefits the judicial system. Id. 357 A.2d at 380-81. Plea agreements help reduce the
court's overcrowding. Id. 347 A.2d at 380. Plea agreements protect society. Id. 347
A.2d at 381. Plea agreements save time and money and promote finality of judgments.
State

V.

Murphy, 125 ldaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994). When properly

utilized, plea bargains aid the administration of justice and should be encouraged. State

v. Pitf, 390 A.2d 312, 313 (MD 2006). These policy considerations presuppose fairness
in securing the agreement between the accused and the prosecutor. Santobello, 404
U.S. at 261.
"It is well established that 'when a plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled."' State v. Wills, 140 ldaho
773, 775, 102 P.3d 380, 382 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 433 (1971)). "Although the analogy may
not hold in all respects, plea bargains are essentially contracts." Puckeft v. United
States, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1430 (2009). However, "a plea agreement is more than a mere
contract between two parties and 'must be attended by constitutional safeguards to
ensure that a defendant receives the performance that he is due."' Craig v. Colorado,
986 P.2d 951, 961 (CO 1999). Due process rights are involved and, therefore, ordinary
contract law principles may not always suffice. Id. "[Tlhe standard to be applied to plea
negotiations is one of fair play and equity under the facts and circumstances of the

case, which, although entailing certain contract concepts, is to be distinguished from
what the State appears to advocate, the strict application of the common law principles
of contracts." Brockman, 357 A.2d at 382-83. "The rigid application of contract law to
plea negotiations would be incongruous since, for example, the trial court is not
ordinarily bound by the compact and . . . it cannot obtain 'specific performance' of a
defendant's promise to plead guilty." Id. 357 A.2d at 383.
We think that when a plea bargain has been agreed to by both a proper
representative of the State and a defendant, and is not in violation of any
law or public policy of this State, it would be a grave error to permit the
prosecution to repudiate its promises in a situation in which it would not be
fair and equitable to allow the State to do so. And as we see it, fairness
and equity require that the State be held to its bargain if the defendant has
to a substantial degree and in a proper manner performed his obligations,
and is willing, but because of some action taken by the prosecution is
unable, to fulfill the remainder of his promises.
Brockman, 357 A.2d at 383-84
"In the process of determining whether disputed plea agreements have been
formed or performed, courts have necessarily drawn on the most relevant body of
developed rules and principles of private law, those pertaining to the formation and
interpretation of commercial contracts." U.S.
1986).

V.

Hawey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir.

ldaho has recognized that "[a] court need not blindly follow contract law

principles in reviewing [ I agreements, however, because '[clases may arise in which the
law of contracts will not provide a sufficient analogy and mode of analysis."' State

v.

Chacon, 146 ldaho 520, 523, 198 P.3d 749, 752 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Dunlap, 141
ldaho at 63, 106 P.3d at 389 (quoting United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36-27 n.1
(9th Cir. 1983)).

Contract law should not be used to revisit an accepted plea to reconsider
whether a contract was formed. U.S. v. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1990).

"A plea bargain is not a

commercial exchange. It is an instrument for the enforcement of the criminal law. . . .
The interests at stake and the judicial context in which they are weighed require that
something more than contract law be applied." U.S.

v. Barron

172 F.3d 1153, 1158 -

1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (Noting that the "court has on other occasions declined to extend
the contract law analogy to invalidate a plea bargain based on a mutual mistake of
law.") "Oral stipulations are binding when acted upon or entered on the court records."
Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 ldaho 892, 898, 204 P.3d 532, 538 (Ct. App. 2009). The
stipulations will be enforced unless good cause is shown why the stipulation should not
be followed. Kohring

v. Robertson, 137 ldaho 94, 99, 44 P.3d 1149, 1154 (2002).

Fraud, duress, or undue influence amounts to good cause.4 Lawrence, 146 ldaho at
898, 204 P.3d at 538. "The government is held to the literal terms of the agreement,
and ordinarily must bear responsibility for any lack of clarity." Thomas v. I.N.S., 35 F.3d
1332, 1337 (gth Cir. 1994).

"There is more at stake than just the liberty of this

defendant. At stake is the honor of the government, public confidence in the fair
administration of justice, and the efficient administration of justice .

.

. ." State v.

Kuchenreuther, 218 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa, 1974) (quoting United Stafes v. Carter, 454
F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972). In reviewing the actions of the prosecutor the Court
should apply the "time-honored fair play norm, and accepted professional standards."

Id.

The State did not assert any good cause to avoid enforcement of the agreement.

On October 5, 2005, Mr. Schultz appeared in juvenile court with his court
appointed attorney Doug Whipple and Mr. Schneider appeared on behalf of the State.
(See generally Tr. 10/05/2005.) At the hearing, Mr. Whipple stated:
Your Honor, in talking with Christopher and previously talking with
Mr. Schneider, Mr. Schneider agreed that upon waiver and if Christopher
ultimately ends up entering a guilty plea to at least some of the charges,
the State would make a recommendation to the district court judge of a
sentence not to exceed - and certainly it could be less than this
depending on negotiations, but not to exceed a 5 year minimum and a 20
year top on the sentence.
(#33000, Tr. 10/05/2005, p.3, L.23 - p.4, L.5.)
The district court asked: "Christopher, I have heard what Mr. Whipple has
represented to the Court that in accordance - is that your agreement on this matter?"
(#33000 Tr. 10/05/2005, p.3, Ls.22-24.) Mr. Schultz, responded, "Yes, your Honor."
(#33000 Tr. 10/05/2005, p.4, Ls.21-24.) Mr. Schneider made no objection to the stated
terms of the agreement. (Tr., p.53, Ls.18-22, p.57, L.2 - p. 57, L.9.)
Here, the juvenile court accepted the parties' agreement.

(#33000 Tr.

10105/2005, p.6, Ls.3-11.) The literal terms of the agreement clearly expressed the
obligations of both parties. (#33000, Tr. 10/05/2005, p.3, L.23 - p.4, L.5.) Mr. Schultz
would relinquish all his rights as a juvenile and agree to the waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction. (#33000, Tr. 10/05/2005, p.3, L.23 - p.4, L.5.) In exchange, the State
would limit its recommendation, if Mr. Schultz pled guilty to some of the charges.
(#33000, Tr. 10/05/2005, p.3, L.23 - p.4, L.5.) The court asked Mr. Schultz specifically
if he understood the terms of the agreement, to which he stated he did. (#33000 Tr.
10/05/2005, p.4, Ls.21-24.) The presiding prosecutor not only had authority to enter
into plea agreements, but also had the authority and the know-how to correct an

inaccurate agreement.

(Tr., p.99, Ls.2-8, p.68, Ls.13-21, p.102, Ls. 10-20.) The

juvenile court accepted the agreement and, therefore, the district court erred in applying
contract principles to the formation of the agreement between Mr. Schuitz and the State
of ldaho. Here the juvenile court accepted the unambiguous agreement, there was no
good cause to not enforce the agreement and, therefore, the State should have been
required to follow it.
2.

Aiternativelv, If This Court Deems It Appropriate To Revaluate Whether A
Contract Was Formed, The District Court Failed To Apolv The Correct
Law And Made Erroneous Factual Findinqs Because An Aareement
Existed That Resolved Juvenile Jurisdiction And Bound The State To A
Specific Limitation On The Sentencing Recommendation
a.

Standard of Review

The appellate courts will exercise de novo review on questions of law. State v.
Chacon, 146 ldaho 520, 523, 198 P.3d 749, 752 (Ct. App. 2008). The person desiring
relief bears the burden of proving by the preponderance of evidence the facts that he
alleges entitles him to relief. Yarbrough v. Estelle, 677 F.Supp. 1033 (N.D. CA 1988).
Determining what the parties agreed to is a question of fact to be resolved by the district
court. United States v. Sutfon, 794 F.2d 1415, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986). The existence of a
contract is to be decided by the district court. Spencer v. Allpress Logging, Inc., 134
ldaho 856, 860, 11 P.3d 475, 479 (2000). Assuming arguendo that the district court
should have revisited the accepted plea to reconsider whether a contract was formed,
its findings are clearly erroneous.

b.

The District Court's Findings of Fact Were Clearly Erroneous
And Application Of The Law To The Facts Would Have
Demonstrated An Agreement Existed Between The State
And Mr. Schultz

The district court concluded that the statement read on the record purporting to
be an agreement between the parties was only a counter offer. (R., p.94.) The district
court determined that there was not competent or substantial evidence of a meeting of
the minds on the essential terms of the contract. (R., p.94.) The court found that in the
absence of some affirmative indication, either verbal or by conduct, the state did not
agree to Mr. Schultz' counter offer.

(R., p.94.)

The district court's findings and

conclusions were in error.
The task of the district court is "not to rewrite the bargain in question, but to
interpret it consistently with the reasonable intent of the parties in light of the
defendant's right to be treated fairly by the government." Craig v. Colorado, 986 P.2d
951, 961 (Colo. 1999). "Oral stipulations of the parties in the presence of the court are
generally held to be binding, especially when acted upon or entered on the court
records, and need not be signed by the parties or their attorneys." Conley v. WhitNesey,
126 Idaho 630, 633, 888 P.2d 804, 807 (Ct. App. 1995). "[Slilence by a party or his
attorney in response to a stipulation of other parties to a proceeding may constitute an
assent to it." Am. Jur.2d Stipulations § 8. "Assent to a stipulation need not be made in
a formal manner and under the particular circumstances of a case, where a party's
counsel remains silent and makes no objection to the stipulation, his passive
acquiescence may constitute an assent to it." McBain v. Sanfa Clara Savings & Loan
Assn., 241 Cal.App.2d 829, 838, 51 Cal.Rptr. 78 (1966) superseded by statute on other

grounds as stated in Familian Corp. v. Imperial Bank, 213 Cal.App.3d 681, 685, 262
Cal.Rptr. 101 (1989).
In the instant case, the district court's finding that the prosecutor's silence did not
constitute assent to the agreement is in error. Deputy Prosecutor Timothy Schneider
represented the State during Mr. Schultz' juvenile proceedings. (Tr., p.59, L.19 - p.60,
L.3, p.33, Ls.14-25; R., p.89.) As a deputy prosecuting attorney for Cassia County,
Mr. Schneider had the authority to enter into agreements with juveniles and other
criminal defendants. (Tr., p.60, Ls.4-9, p.98, Ls.17-19.)
On October 5, 2005, Mr. Schultz appeared in juvenile court with his court
appointed attorney Doug Whipple and Mr. Schneider appeared on behalf of the State.
(See generally Tr. 10105/2005.) At the hearing, Mr. Whipple stated:
Your Honor, in talking with Christopher and previously talking with
Mr. Schneider, Mr. Schneider agreed that upon waiver and if Christopher
ultimately ends up entering a guilty plea to at least some of the charges,
the State would make a recommendation to the district court judge of a
sentence not to exceed - and certainly it could be less than this
depending on negotiations, but not to exceed a 5 year minimum and a 20
year top on the sentence.
(#33000, Tr. 10/05/2005, p.3, L.23 - p.4, L.5.) Thereafter, Mr. Whipple informed the
juvenile court that after reviewing reports with his client, Mr. Schultz was prepared to
waive his rights as a juvenile and to proceed into adult court. (#33000, Tr. 10/05/2005,
p.3, Ls.7-11.)

The district court then asked: "Christopher, I have heard what

Mr. Whipple has represented to the Court that in accordance - is that your agreement
on this matter?" (#33000 Tr. 10/05/2005, p.3, Ls.22-24.) Mr. Schultz, responded, "Yes,
your Honor." (#33000 Tr. 10/05/2005, p.4, Ls.21-24.) Mr. Schneider made no objection
to the stated terms of the agreement.

(Tr., p.53, Ls.18-22, p.57, 1.2 - p.57, L.9.)

Mr. Schneider stated that if the agreement placed on the record was incorrect, he would
have corrected it. (Tr., p.102, Ls.10-20.) Mr. Schneider informed the court that the
stated terms on the record appeared to be a standard recitation and he did not know
what would have been objected to on the agreement. (Tr., p.102, Ls.18-20.)
The district court erred in finding that the State did not assent to the stipulation
read on the record. The district court's finding of fact that the State's presence at the
hearing amounted to nothing and that the State's failure to object to the stipulation was
irrelevant is clear error. The stipulation on the record was not a counter offer and the
district court's finding is in error. The State assented to the agreement and the district
court erred in failing to find that the parties were bound by it.
3.

The State Should Not Be Able To Now Denv The Existence Of The
Aareement Made In Juvenile Court Between The State And Mr. Schultz
Because The Prosecutor's Proper Action Was To Seek Relief From The
Aareement From The District Court And Not Plav Fast And Loose With
The Terms Of The Agreement

In this case, Mr. Schultz asserts that if Blaine Cannon felt that he was not
obligated to follow the terms of the plea agreement that Mr. Schultz asserted existed, he
should have sought relief from the district court. Mr. Schultz asserts that the prosecutor
violated concepts of fairness and accepted professional standards when he decided to
evaluate the existence of the plea agreement and either claim 1) Mr. Schultz'
consideration was insufficient to bind the State or 2) an alleged additional terms of the
agreement existed that Mr. Schultz failed to comply with and, therefore, the State could
unilaterally decide to not follow the contract. Mr. Schultz contends because the State's
actions were inappropriate for either reason argued by the State, the district court erred
in not finding the existence of a plea agreement.

A mere communication breakdown between two prosecutors involved in the case
does not entitle the government to relief form a contract entered into with the defendant.
United States v. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1988)
[Tlhe prosecutor may not play fast and loose with the established terms of
the plea agreement and must explicitly stand by those terms agreed upon.
If the prosecutor's performance of the terms of a plea agreement is not
possible, a withdrawal of the plea is the correct remedy. The prosecutor's
remedy was not to violate or mischaracterize the agreement but rather
move to withdraw the plea agreement if she did not wish to be bound to its
terms. Neither the principle of fairness nor the principles of contract law
allow the State to retain the benefit of the agreement while avoiding its
obligation.
Fernandez v. State, 126 P.3d III,113 (Wyo, 2006) (quoting Ford v. State, 2003 Wy 65,
69 P.3d 407, 412 (Wyo. 2003).
In the instant case, not only did the prosecutor receive the benefit of Mr. Schultz
waiving juvenile jurisdiction, but he also had knowledge about the existence of the other
agreement and choice not to follow the agreement because he did not like it.
Mr. Cannon testified that Mr. Schultz believed he had a deal with the State because he
waived into adult court. (Tr., p.82, L.24 - p.83, L.3.) Mr. Cannon informed Mr. Haley
that the offer had been withdrawn because Mr. Schultz had a preliminary hearing, he
now knew the case better, and had been preparing for trial. (Tr., p.81, Ls.10-15, p.94,
Ls.11-24.) Mr. Cannon felt that Mr. Schultz had not really given anything up by waiving
juvenile jurisdiction and, therefore, he felt there was nothing preventing him "from
renegotiating or withdrawing the offer or completely starting over from scratch." (Tr.,
p.95, Ls.9-15.) Mr. Cannon claimed that he told Mr. Haley to file a motion if he thought
he had breached the plea agreement. (Tr., p.81, Ls.17-22, p.83, Ls.4-8.) Moreover,
Mr. Cannon felt that the parties would be in the same position because they would "start

this thing over" having a waiver hearing. (Tr., p.81, Ls.14-22, see also p.83, Ls.8-15.)
Mr. Cannon did not feel that there was any remedy to the State's breach. (Tr., p.83,
Ls.9-22.) Mr. Cannon took the matter into his own hands and, instead of seeking the
court's assistance in the determination of whether there was a valid contract, he
decided he would not follow it.
Moreover, Mr. Cannon was mistaken about Mr. Schultz not giving him anything
when he waived juvenile jurisdiction. In this case, the State could have chosen to file
the case in adult court because robbery is an included offense under the automatic
waiver statute. See I.C. § 20-509; see also, Sfate v. Larios, 125 ldaho 727, 729, 874
P.2d 538, 540 (1994). However, the parties could have entered into an agreement
dismissing the robbery or a jury may not have found Mr. Schultz guilty of the robbery.
Therefore, had this occurred, without the stipulation the matter would have had to be
returned to juvenile court. See Larios, 125 ldaho at 729, 874 P.2d at 540. Thus,
despite Mr. Cannon's belief, Mr. Schultz actually did give the State something in the
juvenile agreement.
4.

The ldaho Court Of A~peals Has Already Determined That A Plea
Aqreement Existed And. Therefore, The District Court Erred In
Determining Whether An Aqreement Was Formed

"The 'law of the case' doctrine provides that when the 'Supreme Court, in
deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the
decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to
throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent
appeal." Taylor v. Maile, 146 ldaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009) (quoting
Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of ldaho, N.A., 110 ldaho 15, 21, 713 P.2d 1374, 1380 (1985)

(quoting Fiscus v. Beartooth Elec. Coop., lnc., 180 Mont. 434, 435, 491 P.2d 196, 197
(1979))). The "law of the case" doctrine also prevents consideration on a subsequent
appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal.
Id. (citing Bouten Constr. Co.

v. H.F. Magnuson Co.,

133 ldaho 756, 762, 992 P.2d

In Schultz I,the ldaho Court of Appeals provided:
In this case, the transcript of the trial court proceedings presents two clear
and unequivocal, but entirely contradictory, agreements pertaining to the
sentence recommendation that the State would make if Schultz pleaded
guilty. Nothing in the record explains or reconciles this disparity. It may be,
as the State argues, that the first agreement was abandoned or deemed
never to have been activated because Schultz did not plead guilty
immediately thereafter, but the record does not disclose that. As we said
in State v. Lenon, 143 ldaho 415, 418, 146 P.3d 681, 684 (Ct. App. 2005),
"although claims of breach of a plea agreement may be heard initially on
appeal with a less-than-fully-developed record, there is a preference for a
complete record developed in the trial court." Here, the ambiguity in the
record could have been resolved if Schultz had filed a motion in the trial
court seeking relief for the State's alleged breach of agreement. On the
existing record the ambiguity is such that we decline to address Schultz's
claim of prosecutorial breach. The claim is preserved without prejudice to
Schultz's opportunity to pursue the matter through appropriate
proceedings in the trial court should he wish to do so.
State

V.

Schultz, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 464, Docket No. #33000, pp.3-4

(May 13,2008).
The Court of Appeals recognized that an agreement existed. State

v. Schultz,

2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 464, Docket No. #33000, pp.3-4 (May 13, 2008). It
indicated that the matter should be evaluated before the district court to determine if
additional terms of the agreement existed or whether Mr. Schultz breached. State

v.

Schultz, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 464, Docket No. #33000, pp.3-4 (May 13,

On review by the district court, there has been no demonstration that any
additional terms to the agreement existed. Mr. Cannon admitted that Mr. Schneider
"may have" been responsible for "conveying an offer" to Mr. Whipple. (Tr., p.70, Ls.58.) Mr. Cannon could not remember any specific conversations he may have had with
Mr. Schneider about Mr. Schultz' case.

(Tr., p.70, L.22 - p.71, L.3.)

Although

Mr. Cannon tried to inform the court that he "may have" and he "think[sInhe probably did
talk with Mr. Whipple about the case, he could not remember any specifics. (Tr., p.71,
Ls.ll-17.)

Mr. Cannon could not recall any specific conversation with Mr. Whipple.

(Tr., p.72, Ls.10-12.) Moreover, Mr. Whipple could not recall any conversations with
Mr. Cannon about this case. (Tr., p.34, Ls.1-7.) Nevertheless, Mr. Cannon admitted
Mr. Schneider had authority to make an agreement with Mr. Schultz. (Tr., p.93, Ls.1213.)
Mr. Cannon acknowledged that nothing on the record indicated waiving the
preliminary hearing was part of the agreement.

(Tr., p.92, Ls.16-19.) Mr. Cannon

further stated "[wlhat Mr. Whipple stated on the record was not [his] agreement." (Tr.,
p.92, L.25 - p.93, L.1.)

And although Mr. Cannon believed that Mr. Schultz' case

involved automatic waiver offenses and he allegedly had been negotiating the case with
the attorney who would be representing Mr. Schultz in the future, Mr. Cannon never
appeared at the juvenile waiver hearing although he was certain that he would
eventually be the prosecutor on the case in adult court. (Tr., p.66, Ls.3-4, p.69, Ls.2-20,
p.93, Ls.2-3.) Neither Mr. Whipple nor Mr. Schneider had any independent recollection
of Mr. Schultz' case. What was on the record was the agreement and there were no
other terms to the agreement.

D.

The State Breached Its Obligations Under The Plea Agreement
Recommending Sentences Greater Than It Had Aqreed To Recommend

By

The ldaho Supreme Court has held that, "[wlhether a plea agreement has been
breached is a question of law to be reviewed by this Court de novo, in accordance with
contract law standards." State v. Jafek, 141 ldaho 71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005)
(citing State

V.

Barnett, 133 ldaho 231, 234, 985 P.2d 111, 114 (1999); United States v.

Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1998))
Mr.Schultz asserts that the

State breached the

plea agreement by

recommending sentences greater than it had agreed to recommend.

Mr. Schultz

contends that due to the State's breach he was deprived of his right to due process of
law. Mr. Schultz requests that this matter be remanded for further proceedings.
In the instant case, on October 5, 2005, the State promised Mr. Schultz that upon
waiver into adult court that if he ultimately pled guilty to the charges in the future, the
State would limit its recommendation to no more than a twenty-year indeterminate
sentence and to no more than a five years fixed term. (Tr. 10/05/2005, p.3, L.23 - p.4,
L.5.) Specifically the agreement was expressed to the court as follows:
[The State] agreed that upon waiver and if Christopher ultimately ends up
entering a guilty plea to at least some of the charges, the State would
make a recommendation to the district court judge of a sentence not to
exceed - and certainly it could be less than this depending on
negotiations, but not to exceed a 5 year minimum and a 20 year top on the
sentence.
(Tr. 10/05/2005, p.3, L.23 - p.4, L.5.)

Mr. Schultz agreed to waive his rights as a

juvenile and proceed into adult court. (Tr. 10/05/2005, p.4, Ls.8-10.) When the district
court asked Mr. Schultz if this was his agreement on the matter, Mr. Schultz responded
in the affirmative. (Tr. 10105/2005, p.4, Ls.21-24.) Pursuant to the stipulation, the

district court made factual findings and conclusions of law completing the process of
waiving Mr. Schultz into adult court. (Tr. 10105/2005, p.5, L.4 - p.6, L.ll.)
Mr. Schultz did not engage in any conduct that would allow the State to breach
its obligations under the plea agreement. The agreement provided that the State's
recommendation was conditioned on Mr. Schultz agreement to be waived into adult
court and if he ultimately pled guilty to some of the charges. (Tr. 10/05/2005, p.3, L.23

- p.4, L.5.) Mr. Schultz did not dispute the waiver hearing and he ultimately pled guilty
to some charges.

Mr. Schultz fully complied with the requirements of the plea

agreement.
To the extent there is any ambiguity in the record about the terms of the plea
agreement, the confusion must be resolved in favor of Mr. Schultz. The State failed to
place anything in the record that would have authorized its breach of the first plea
agreement that Mr. Schultz fully performed under. There is no authority for the State to
accept the defendant's performance of an agreement and then renege on their end of
the agreement unless the defendant himself breaches.

Here, Mr. Schultz did not

breach and the State may not claim ambiguity to protect itself from its breach. As such,
the State's recommendation at sentencing constituted a breach of the plea agreement
not excused by any conduct of Mr. Schultz and, therefore, the State denied Mr. Schultz
his right to due process of law.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Schultz respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea
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